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Earlier this year the Federal Government resurrected its policy on choice of superannuation 
fund after its bill on this issue failed in the Senate in 2001. Presently most employees have to 
join the superannuation fund specified by their employer or workplace agreement. Choice of 
fund means that employees will be able to choose which fund they join and have the freedom 
to subsequently switch to another fund. The Government expects that greater freedom of 
choice will increase competition between funds, which in turn will reduce fund costs, 
increase returns and consequently maximise members’ benefits (SSCS, 1998).  Informed 
choice is essential for the choice of fund objectives to be met but significant barriers to 
informed choice presently exist. These barriers include an absence of relevant information 
disclosures by superannuation funds and the greater problem of members who are unable or 
are unwilling to exercise choice. While the first barrier could be overcome by establishing 
standardised measures of fund performance, the potential problem of large numbers of 
workers not exercising choice requires rethinking the default option. A possible solution is 
the establishment of a universal default fund.  
Barriers to Achieving Informed Choice 
The Government first flagged its intention to introduce choice of fund during the 1996 
election campaign. After several iterations between the House of Representatives and the 
Senate, the bill ultimately failed on the vote of the Democrats who supported the choice bill 
but sought to trade off their support on that bill in exchange for the Government addressing 
another unrelated superannuation matter (same-sex couple rights to access of superannuation 
benefits). The Government declined the Democrats ‘deal’ and the choice issue was shelved.  
After vigorously opposing the Government’s choice of fund proposals for many years, the 
Labor Party is also now canvassing the choice issue in a policy options paper (see Sherry, 
2002). Now that choice of fund is firmly back on the agenda, no doubt those same issues 
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which arose during the six-year battle over the choice bill will be redebated. Although there 
was universal agreement that informed choice is an essential prerequisite for a choice-of-fund 
system to work effectively, the question of how informed choice might be achieved was not 
fully explored. Disclosure and education were flagged as two key factors impacting informed 
choice. To exercise informed choice, superannuation fund members first need access to 
relevant and reliable information, and second, fund members need to have the capacity and 
motivation to use that information.  
Effective disclosure is controlled by superannuation funds and through regulation. The 
capacity and motivation issue is internal to each individual member and this can be 
influenced by factors such as education programs. The problems with both fund disclosure 
practices and members’ capacity and willingness to exercise choice need to be addressed 
before choice is widely introduced. The dangers of not doing so could see Australia 
experiencing the same sorts of problems as in the U.K. where billions of Pounds of retirement 
savings were lost through mis-selling when choice was introduced. In 1988 legislation came 
into effect in the U.K. giving employees greater choice by allowing them to transfer from 
their employer-sponsored pension plans to a personal pension product offered by insurance 
companies (Select Committee on Treasury, 1998). Large numbers of employees were lured 
away from sound company pension plans by unrealistic promises made by insurance 
companies and independent financial advisers, resulting in them suffering “considerable 
financial detriment” (SSCS, 1998, para. 11.4). By the early 1990s this mis-selling became 
clear and regulators stepped in stop the practices and seek compensation for the losses 
suffered. A recent estimate of the total amount that insurance companies are likely to pay out 
in compensation is $A27 billion (McIlwrath, 2000). The vast majority of those affected were 
individuals with reasonable levels of education and in many cases were highly trained 
professionals (e.g. academics and teachers), showing that even well-educated individuals are 
susceptible to making poor pension plan choices (Kennedy, 1998).  
While active choice involves risks associated with making wrong decisions, there is a 
potentially larger problem associated with members who are unable or are unwilling to 
exercise choice. Under a choice-of-fund regime the employer of those individuals will direct 
the members’ contributions to a default fund, which under present proposals is likely to be 
the major fund in operation in the individual’s workplace. The Senate Select Committee on 
Superannuation (1998, para. 8.24) highlighted the importance of ensuring that “default funds 
protect the interests of employees who are unable to protect their own long-term interests” 
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and the need for greater regulation of default funds. However, industry representatives argued 
against increasing regulation of default funds because it would work against underlying 
competitive pressures (SSCS, 1998, para. 8.16). This apparent conflict between the two 
objectives of protecting the interests of members in default funds and market competition 
requires rethinking the default fund option.  
Disclosure of comparable and understandable information  
While superannuation disclosures have recently been expanded under the Financial Services 
Reform (FSR) Act, there is a question of whether the reforms have delivered on their specific 
aims, that is, to provide comparable and understandable information. The Australian 
accounting conceptual framework includes these two characteristics of comparability and 
understandability as essential for financial information to be useful for decision making, 
however, the characteristics of ‘relevance’ and ‘reliability’ are pre-eminent (SAC 3). That is, 
for information to be useful it needs to relevant to the decision at hand, and is reliable if it 
faithfully represents, without undue bias or error, the substance of the transactions and events 
that the information purports to represent.  
Two key aspects of superannuation funds’ operations which are relevant to members’ or 
potential members’ decisions are the income generated and fees charged by the fund, usually 
measured as investment returns and management expense ratios (MERs) respectively. 
Standardisation of such performance ratios ensures reliability and comparability, in that if all 
superannuation funds use the same bases to calculate the ratios, then there is greater 
confidence that the rates of return and MERs of different funds represent the same types of 
underlying economic events, and are therefore comparable. Present industry guidelines on 
calculation of MERs and other performance ratios are unreliable, even on the admission of 
industry insiders, because there is scope to include or exclude various items. Prescribing how 
the ratios are measured in an accounting standard will enhance the reliability of such 
information.  
During the previous debate on choice of fund, concerns were expressed about the lack of 
consistency in application of industry guidelines on performance measurement and the 
absence of enforceable standards. When the (then) Senate Select Committee on 
Superannuation and Financial Services learned from the Chairman of the Australian 
Accounting Standards Board in early 2001 that the accounting standard governing the 
preparation of superannuation fund financial reports (AAS 25) was to be reviewed, they 
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expressed hope that revisions to the standard would address the standardisation issue 
(SSCSFS, 2001). However, the draft of the revised accounting standard (ED AAS 25) that 
was issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in mid-2001 does not address the issue 
of standardising the method of calculating performance ratios. To date no further discussion 
or proposals on revision of the accounting standard have been issued by either the accounting 
profession or the accounting standard setters. It seems that a valuable opportunity to establish 
standards to ensure superannuation funds disclose information which is comparable has been 
lost.    
In relation to the second aim of the FSR reforms – for disclosed information to be 
understandable – two issues arise. First, to make financial information more understandable 
generally requires simplification of that information (e.g., graphical presentation). However, 
with simplification information is lost, giving rise to a paradox: if financial information is 
simplified to make it more understandable, then the loss of detail makes the information less 
reliable. Such transformations are also open to manipulation (in the absence of audit). Given 
that superannuation information is by nature complex, simplification inevitably leads to 
disclosure of less reliable, and therefore less useful information.  
Capacity and motivation of members to exercise choice 
Even if the problems with ensuring disclosure of reliable, comparable and understandable 
information were overcome, there is still the issue of whether superannuation fund members 
have the capacity and/or motivation to use the information to exercise choice. With the 
introduction of choice the Government proposes to include an education program for the 
eight million or so superannuation fund members. However, many simply do not have the 
capacity to become adequately informed to make informed choices. ABS statistics show that 
46 percent of Australians have “unsatisfactorily low levels of literacy” and 15 percent are 
“functionally illiterate” (SSCSFS, 2000). These statistics suggest that educating the vast 
population of superannuation members to adequate levels of financial literacy for them to 
make informed decisions about their superannuation is problematic.  
A further issue is that of members suffering ‘emotional disengagement’ from their 
superannuation. Structural changes in the labour market have exacerbated the problem with 
the growth of casual jobs increasing the risk of workers losing track of their superannuation 
entitlements, as evidenced by some recent surveys. One survey found that up to 50% of 
workers are unsure to which fund their superannuation contributions have been directed 
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(Lampe, 2001). Another survey similarly found that 64 percent of fund members had little or 
no knowledge of their funds, only a quarter of fund members read some or all of the annual 
fund report, and only 43 percent of those were able to recall some information detailed in the 
report (Kavanagh, 1998).   
Widespread member disengagement is further evidenced by the large amounts of money the 
Australian Taxation Office (ATO) has collected from employers who failed to comply with 
SG obligations  ($100 million represented by 403,000 unredeemed SG vouchers) for which 
the ATO is trying to find the owners (ANAO, 2000). Then there are the lost members, that is, 
those members with whom superannuation funds have lost contact and have been referred to 
the ATO Lost Members Register. There are approximately 4 million accounts with total 
assets of $5.5 billion on the register, representing about 18 percent of total superannuation 
accounts (Productivity Commission, 2001). If large numbers of members presently do not 
have the ability and/or motivation to keep track of their superannuation entitlements, are they 
likely to actively exercise choice when it is offered?  
Most people agree with the principle of fund choice as shown by the ASSIRT Investor 
Market Trends survey which found that 83 percent of respondents considered choice-of-fund 
legislation to be a ‘good’ or ‘great’ idea (Superfunds, 2000). However, when choice is 
actually offered, as is the case where many funds offer their members investment choice, on 
average, fewer than ten percent of members actively exercise that choice (SSCSFS, 2000). 
This suggests that many individuals value choice as an option, but are willing to exercise that 
choice only where the expected benefits exceed risk transfer costs (Brown, Gallery & 
Gallery, 2002). That is, becoming informed is costly, particularly in relation to complex 
superannuation issues. Such costs include the time taken to acquire, read and interpret 
relevant fund reports and other material, attend training session, and to seek professional 
advice from financial experts or other information intermediaries. There is also the risk and 
associated costs of making the wrong decision. If these costs exceed the perceived benefits of 
choice, then members will rationally avoid the choice decision. Even where members have 
the capacity to become informed to exercise choice, risk transfer costs are likely explain why 
they do not do so (Brown, Gallery, Gallery & Guest, 2001).   
The way forward?  
With the recent corporate collapses and accounting scandals, much has been said about the 
need for greater transparency and improved disclosure by corporations. Although there have 
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also been concerns expressed about super fund disclosure by various reviews including those 
undertaken by the Senate Select Committee and the Superannuation Working Group, there 
has not been a concerted effort to remedy the inadequacies of the disclosure standards and 
practices. The disclosure problem can be relatively easily overcome by putting in place a set 
of effective disclosure rules which ensure that trustees are fully accountable to their members, 
and members and others have full access to relevant, reliable and comparable information 
about the financial position and performance of superannuation funds. 
However, establishing and enforcing disclosure standards does not overcome the wider 
problem of members lacking the skills or motivation to become informed to exercise choice. 
If choice is introduced in the current environment where there are large numbers of 
individuals who are unable or are unwilling to exercise choice, there is a very real danger of 
exploitation on a massive scale such as that experienced in the U.K. Past experience of low 
take-up rates where choice is offered suggests that when choice of fund is introduced 
universally, only a minority of members will actively participate in the choice decision. The 
Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia estimates that as many as 50 to 70 percent 
of workers will not make an active choice of fund (SSCSFS, 2000) and therefore will end up 
in the default option. If this is the case then the standards and benefit protection mechanisms 
in default funds becomes paramount. Given arguments that increased regulation of default 
funds will work against competition in the superannuation industry, a viable alternative is to 
establish a universal default fund (UDF), as suggested by Brown et al. (2002). It would be 
more efficient to more closely regulate a single UDF than multiple default funds, and the 
UDF would still be subject to competitive market pressures (i.e., members of the UDF would 
still have a choice to join another fund.  Thus a government-regulated UDF would cater for 
those members who are unable or unwilling to make informed choices and ensure their 
retirement savings are not frittered away by poor fund choices or exploitation. While such a 
move is likely to be unpalatable to both major political parties and the superannuation 
industry, it nevertheless presents a possible solution to a widespread problem. In an industry 
worth over $500 billion there is huge potential for vast sums of retirement moneys to be 
misallocated or lost. There is clearly a need to address existing problems in the 
superannuation system before the Pandora’s Box of choice-of-fund is opened.   
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